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ARTICLE
THE MARYLAND PERSONAL INFORMATION
PROTECTION ACT: STRENGTHENING MARYLAND'S
SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAW
By: Michael Greenberger* and Mathew Swinburne**
1.

INTRODUCTION

"[W]e are vulnerable to people who would use our identities against us."J
It has been reported that in 2010,8.1 million Americans were victims
of identity theft.2 The U.S. Government Accountability Office generally
defines identity theft as "'stealing' another person's personal identifying
information-such as Social Security number (SSN), date of birth, and
mother's maiden name-and then using the information to fraudulently
establish credit, run up debt, or take over existing financial accounts.,,3
However, this definition fails to capture the full spectrum of threats
presented by identity theft. Such stolen information can also be exploited
to commit phone or utilities fraud, commit government documents fraud,
fraudulently rent a home, or fraudulently obtain employment under the
stolen identity.4 Identity theft has a substantial financial impact. In 2010,
the total cost of this fraud in the United States was an estimated $37
billion, while the average out of pocket cost for the identity theft victim

* Michael Greenberger, J.D., is the Founder and Director of the Center for Health and
Homeland Security, at the University of Maryland, Baltimore as well as a professor at the
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.
** Mathew Swinburne, J.D., is a Law and Policy Analyst at the Center for Health and
Homeland Security.
I
Kevin Rademacher, Clarke: ID Theft Prevention Tied to Anti-terrorism Efforts, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Apr. 13, 2005, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com!news/2005/apr/13/
clarke-id-theft-prevention-tied-to-anti-terrorism-I
(quoting
Richard
Clarke,
former
counterterrorism czar for Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton).
2
JAVELIN STRATEGY AND RESEARCH, 2011 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY REpORT 1 (Feb. 8,
20 11), available at http://www.idsafety.net/201IIDFraudReportRelease.pdf.
3
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-424T, IDENTITY THEFT: AVAILABLE
DATA INDICATE GROWTH IN PREVALENCE AND COST I (Feb. 14, 2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02424t.pdf.
4 About Identity Theft, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: FIGHTING BACK AGAINST IDENTITY
THEFT, available at http://www.ftc.govlbcp/edulmicrosites/idtheftlconsumers/about-identitytheft.html (listing potential threats resulting from identity theft) (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).
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was $631. 5 It is important to note that during this time period, Maryland
ranked ninth in per capita identity theft complaints. 6
In a post-9fll world, identity theft also has serious homeland security
implications. In 2003, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Assistant
Director ofthe Counter Terrorism Division, addressed this issue:
Today, the threat is made graver by the fact that terrorists can
utilize identity theft as well as Social Security Number fraud to
enable them to obtain such things as cover employment and
access to secure locations. These and similar means can be
utilized by terrorists to obtain Driver's Licenses, and bank and
credit card accounts through which terrorism financing is
facilitated. Terrorists and terrorist groups require funding to
perpetrate their terrorist agendas. The methods used to finance
terrorism range from the highly sophisticated to the most basic.
There is virtually no financing method that has not at some level
been exploited by these groups. Identity theft is a key catalyst
fueling many of these methods. 7
These concerns are not speculative-they are reality. In 2002, an Al
Qaeda terrorist cell in Spain utilized stolen credit card information to
make numerous purchases. 8 Terrorists in Great Britain amassed over
$3.5 million in fraudulent charges, using stolen credit card information, to
purchase equipment, prepaid cell phones, and airline tickets for jihadi
field operations. 9 It is also believed that Imam Samudra, convicted
terrorist and the engineer of the 2002 bombing of a Bali nightclub, tried
to fund the attack utilizing stolen credit card information. 1o In Samudra's
jailhouse biography he calls on jihadists "to take the holy war into
cyberspace by attacking the U.S. computers, with the particular aim of

JAVELIN STRATEGY AND RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 1,2.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR
JANUARy-DECEMBER 2011, 14 (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.fic.gov/sentinellreports/
sentinel-annual-reports/sentinel-cy20 1O. pdf.
7
Fraudulent Identification Documents and the Implication for Homeland Security:
Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. On Homeland Sec., lOS th Congo (Oct. 1, 2003)
(testimony of John S. Pistole, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau
of Investigation), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fraudulent-identificationdocuments-and-the-implications-for-homeland-security.
8
U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-705, CYBERCRIME: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE ENTITIES FACE CHALLENGES IN ADDRESSING CYBER THREATS 22 (June 2007),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07705.pdf.
9
Kimberly Kiefer Peretti, Data Breaches: What the Underground World of "Carding"
Reveals, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 375,393-95 (2009) (discussing how
terrorists use stolen identities and credit card information).
10
Id. at 394.
5

6
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committing credit card fraud." 11 In addition to financing terrorist
operations, identity theft is utilized to generate false documents such as
birth certificates, licenses, social security cards, and passports. 12 The
9/11 Commission Report highlights the danger of these false documents
when it states, "[f]or terrorists, travel documents are as important as
weapons."J3
One way to help prevent identity theft is to require businesses that
own, license, or maintain personal information to notify individuals when
their data systems have been breached, exposing this sensitive personal
information. Data breaches can result from improper handling or
disposal of paper records, stolen or lost data storage devices, hacking of
databases, employee theft, or improper handling of electronic data. 14
These breaches present a considerable risk. Since the beginning of 2005,
over 540,000,000 records containing private personal information have
been compromised as the result of data breaches in the United States. 15
In addition to exposing sensitive personal information, these incidents
result in considerable financial burdens for the companies subject to the
breach. One benchmark study estimates that in 2010 the average large
data breach (between 1,000-100,000 compromised records) cost
approximately $7.2 million. 16
By requiring notification, businesses are provided with an incentive to
improve their data security in order to avoid reputational damage, and
individuals are given a chance to take protective actions. States have
taken a leading role in establishing broad-spectrum security breach
notification laws ("SBNL"). California enacted the first SBNL in 2003 17
and now 45 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin

11
Alan Sipress, An Indonesian's Prison Memoir Takes Holy War Into Cyberspace,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlac2/wpdyn/A62095-2004Dec13.
12
See Kristin M. Finklea, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., R40599, IDENTITY THEFT: TRENDS
AND ISSUES 19 (Jan. 5, 2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/miscIR40599.pdf
(discussing terrorist utilizing identity theft to generate fraudulent documents).
13
NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REpORT, 384 (2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdfi'sec12.pdf.
14
See Data Breaches: A Year in Review, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARING HOUSE (Dec. 16,
2011), http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach-year-review-2011.
15
See Security Breaches 2005--Present, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARING HOUSE,
https:llwww.privacyrights.org/data-breach (last updated Apr. 6, 2012) (maintaining a running
count of reported information security breaches).
16
PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2010 ANNuAL STUDY: U.S. COST OF A DATA BREACH, 11, 13
(Mar. 2011), available at http://www.symantec.comlcontentlenlus/aboutlmedialpdfs/
symantec-ponemon_data_breach_costs_report.pdf.
17
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, .82 (West 2011).
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Islands have followed suit. 18 Alabama, Kentucky, New Mexico, and
South Dakota are the four states that do not have security breach
notification laws. 19 Maryland enacted its security breach notification
legislation in 2007 with the passage of the Maryland Personal
Information Protection Act ("MPIP A"). 20
While the MPIP A provides important safeguards, the Act can be
strengthened to better secure Marylanders' personal information. This
article evaluates the effectiveness of MPIP A and presents solutions to
address identified gaps. The analysis of this piece focuses on the
following key components of MPIP A: (1) the type of infonnation
protected by the act; (2) the parties subject to MPIPA's requirements; (3)
breach notification triggers and timelines; (4) preemptive security
measures; and (5) select civil enforcement provisions. The modifications
presented in this analysis will increase the legislations effectiveness by:
(1) closing loopholes to increase the legislation's applicability; (2)
addressing ambiguous provisions; (3) increasing the legislation's ability
to prevent information security breaches in the first place; and (4)
creating incentives to help ensure that each business's risk analysis favors
compliance with Maryland's legislation. These suggested improvements
would better secure the personal infonnation of Marylanders and, as a
result, mitigate the financial and security threats posed by identity theft.
II.

INFORMATION PROTECTED BY THE MARYLAND PERSONAL
INFORMATION PROTECTION ACT

In analyzing the Maryland Personal Infonnation Protection Act
("MPIP A"), the first element of the legislation that must be explored is
the type of information the Maryland government has chosen to protect.
Unfortunately, the current legislation is underinclusive because it
narrowly defines personal information and it has a bias for electronic
data.
A. Defining Personal Information

The core of all state security breach notification laws ("SBNL") is the
definition of "personal information." As discussed earlier, SBNLs

18
See Security Breach Legislation 2011, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.orgldefault.aspx?tabid=22295 (last updated Dec. 21, 2011); see also DATA
QUALITY CAMPAIGN, STATE SECURITY BREACH RESPONSE LAWS: STATE-BY-STATE SUMMARY
TABLE,
available
at
http://www.dataqualitycampaign.org:8080/files/State%20Security''1020Breach%20Chart%20Fi
nal%20for%20posting%202020 II %2003%201 O.pdf (last updated Feb. 2011).
19
STATE SECURITY BREACH RESPONSE LAWS: STATE-BY-STATE SUMMARY TABLE, supra
note 18, at 1, 7, 13, 17.
20
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-3501 to -3508 (West 2011).

2012]

Strengthening Maryland's Security Breach Notification Law 133

protect individuals' personal information in an attempt to prevent its use
in the perpetration of identity theft. In Maryland, there are three basic
protections provided under MPIP A: (1) protection of personal
information during the disposal of records 21 ; (2) adoption of reasonable
security procedures and practices to prevent unauthorized access to
personal information22 ; and (3) individual notification when a business
has experienced a breach of security that resulted in or will likely result in
the misuse of an individual's personal information. 23 MPIPA defines
personal information as:
an individual's first name or first initial and last name in
combination with anyone or more of the following data elements,
when the name or data elements are not encrypted, redacted, or
otherwise protected by another method that renders the
information unreadable or unusable: (i) A Social Security
Number; (ii) A driver's license number; (iii) A Financial account
number, including a credit card or debit card number, that in
combination with any required security code, access code, or
password, would permit access to an individual's financial
information account; or (iv) An Individuals Taxpayer
Identification Number. 24
In addition to the exclusion of information that is rendered unreadable or
unusable, MPIP A also excludes the following from its definition of
personal information:
(i) Publicly available information that is lawfully made available
to the general public from federal, State, or local government
records; (ii) Information that an individual has consented to have
publicly disseminated or listed; or (iii) Information that is
disseminated or listed in accordance with the federal Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. 25
It is important to note that this definition requires two separate
components to qualify as personal information: the individual's name and
one of the enumerated data elements. 26
There are two problems with this definition of personal information.
First, the definition fails to capture the full spectrum of data that could be
utilized to perpetrate identity theft. For example, some secured websites

21
22
23

24
25
26

COM. LAW § 14-3502.
COM. LAW § 14-3503.
COM. LAW § 14-3504.
COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(1).
COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(2).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(l) (West 2011).
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have password retrieval functions that require an individual's email
address and the answer to a personal security question, such as the
individual's mother's maiden name or the name of a pet. 27 The
combination of such information can be used to gain access to an
individual's account and expose additional information that can be used
to perpetrate identity theft.28 Another example of a gap in MPIP A is the
failure to capture biometric and genetic data within the definition of
personal information. While not currently in wide use, these types of data
have the potential to be exploited for identity theft as technology
develops. 29 Further, the uniquely personal nature of this data presents a
heightened vulnerability because "[w]hile individuals can always obtain a
new Social Security number, they cannot be issued new fingerprints,
DNA, retinas, or faces.,,3o
The second issue with MPIP A's definition of personal information is
that its two-pronged approach, requiring the individual's name and an
additional data element, limits its effectiveness. For example, if a
business experienced an information security breach that exposed an
individual's social security number, driver's license number, mother's
maiden name, and street address, it would not qualify for the protections
of MPIPA because the breach did not expose the individual's name.
Such a distinction seems like a dangerous line to draw.
Other states have recognized the need for a more inclusive definition
of personal information, and there are several approaches to achieving
this goal. Some states apply the same two-component approach used by
Maryland, requiring the individual's name and an additional data
element. 3! However, they adopt a more expansive list of qualifying data
elements. For example, North Carolina recognizes email addresses,
electronic signatures, fingerprints, biometric data, and a parent's legal
surname prior to marriage. 32 North Dakota has expanded its definition to
include an individual's date of birth, mother's maiden name, and an

27
See Jacqueline May Tom, A Simple Compromise: The Need for a Federal Data Breach
Notification Law, 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1569, 1598 (Fall 2010) (utilizing this example when
discussing the need for a flexible definition of personal information in security breach
notification legislation).
28
/d.
29
Brendad St. Amant, Recent Development, The Misplaced Role of Identity Theft in
Triggering Public Notice of Database Breaches, 44 HARV. 1. ON LEGIS. 505, 525-26 (2007)
(discussing the current and potential uses of biometric data and the need to include this
information in security breach notification laws).
30
Id. at 526.
31
See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa(1)(b) (West 2011).
32
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §75-61(lO) (West 2011) (defining personal information as a
person's first name or first initial and last name in combination with identifying information as
defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §14-113.20(b) (West 2011».
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identification number assigned to the individual by his or her employer. 33
Others have included medical and healthcare information in their
definition of protected information. 34 Wisconsin has taken a progressive
approach and included an individual's DNA profile. 35
Alternatively, New York defines personal information as "any
information concerning a natural person which, because of name,
number, personal mark or other identifier, can be used to identify such
natural person.,,36 However, New York limits the scope of this expansive
definition by only requiring breach notification when it pertains to
"private information. ,,37 New York defines "private information" as
personal information in combination with any of the following data
elements: "(1) social security number; (2) driver's license or non-driver
license identification card number; or (3) account number, credit or debit
card number, in combination with any required security code, access code
or password that would permit access to an individual's financial
account.,,38 New York's system is similar to Maryland's two-pronged
definition, except the name requirement has been replaced by a more
expansive individual identifier.
Oregon has expanded its definition of personal information not by
adding data elements, but by removing requirements. Its SBNL does not
require that the breached data include the individual's first name or first
initial and last name. 39 It only requires that data elements acquired in the
security breach are sufficient to permit a person to commit identity
theft.4o However, Oregon limits the qualifying data elements to the
following:
(A) Social Security number; (B) Driver license number or state
identification card number issued by the Department of
Transportation; (C) Passport number or other United States issued
identification number; or (D) Financial account number, credit or
debit card number, in combination with any required security
code, access code or password that would permit access to a
consumer's financial account. 41

N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 5 1-30-01 (2)(West 2011).
See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.002(a)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2011); see also
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-llO-103(7)(D) (West 2011).
35
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98(1)(b)(4) (West 2011).
36 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa(l)(a) (West 2011).
37
See GEN. Bus. § 899-aa(2)-(3).
38
GEN. Bus. § 899-aa(l)(b).
39 OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 646A.602(l1)(b) (West 2011).
40
Id.
41
See § 646A.602(ll)(a); see also §646A.602 (ll)(b) (stating .that the combination of
elements must be composed of elements listed in (a)).
33

34
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To ensure that MPIPA is effective in protecting Marylanders from
identity theft, the definition of personal information has to be broadened
to capture additional sensitive information. At the same time, the
definition needs flexibility to adapt to the arrival of new types of
information and technology that can expose individuals to identity theft.
Such flexibility must also account for information combinations outside
of the traditional name and additional data element format.
To
accomplish these goals, Maryland should adopt New York's personal
information definition: "any information concerning a natural person
which, because of name, number, personal mark or other identifier, can
be used to identify such natural person.,,42 However, it should not be
limited by requiring private information data elements to trigger the
statutes protections. Instead, Maryland should adopt a non-exclusive list
of data elements that qualify as per se personal information. The list of
data elements should build upon what Maryland has already enumerated,
while adding critical information such as electronic signatures, biometric
data, and a parent's legal surname prior to marriage. The expansiveness
of this definition would be sufficiently limited by two provisions. First,
MPIP A currently excludes the following from its definition of personal
information:
(i) Publicly available information that is lawfully made available
to the general public from federal, State, or local government
records; (ii) Information that an individual has consented to have
publicly disseminated or listed; or (iii) Information that is
disseminated or listed in accordance with the federal Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability ACt. 43
The second relevant provision is the proposed notification trigger,
discussed in Section III, Subsection A of this article, which would limit
notification to instances where there is a reasonable threat of Identity
Fraud. 44 While additional information would be protected under this
definition of personal information, this proposed trigger would reduce the
need to provide notice to instances where there is a threat of a specific
harm. Overall the above-proposed definition of personal information
ensures greater inclusion of sensitive data and allows the statute to remain
effective as technology and data use progress. 45

Bus. § 899-aa (1)(a).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3501 (d)(2) (West 2011).
44
Tom, supra note 27, at 1579-80.
45
See Tom, supra note 27, at 1588-89 (suggesting a similar approach for defining
personal information for federal security breach notification legislation).
42

43

GEN.
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B. A Bias for Computerized Data
The second issue with Maryland's current treatment of personal
information is that it varies depending on the medium on which it is
stored. Computerized personal information is provided a greater level of
protection than hard copies of the same information. This discrepancy
can be seen by analyzing the three basic protections provided by MPIP A.
The first, the protection of personal information during the disposal of
records, is provided to all personal information regardless of its storage
media. MPIP A states that
[w]hen a business is destroying a customer's records that contain
personal information of the customer, the business shall take
reasonable steps to protect against unauthorized access to or use
of the personal information, taking into account (1) The
sensitivity of the records; (2) The nature and size of the business
and its operations; (3) The costs and benefits of different
destruction methods; and (4) Available technology. 46
This protection is applicable to paper records and other non-computerized
media because MPIP A defines "records" as "information that is inscribed
on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium
and is retrievable in perceivable form.,,47 The second protection, the need
to establish reasonable security procedures and practices as required
under section 14-3503 of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland
Code, also applies to all personal information. 48
Alternatively, the third protection, which requires businesses to notify
individuals when their personal information has been exposed as the
result of a security breach, only applies to computerized data. A
"[b ] reach of the security of a system" is defined as "the unauthorized
acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security,
confidentiality, or integrity of the personal information maintained by a
business.... ,,49 The above described breach serves as the only trigger for
the notification processes. 50
As a result, only the exposure of
computerized data can initiate a business's notification protocol.
Such a restriction on the notification requirement undercuts the
effectiveness of Maryland's security breach notification law. Personal

46
47
48

COM. LAW § 14-3502(b).
COM. LAW § 14-3501(e).
See COM. LAW § 14-3503

(placing no limits on the applicability of this protective

provision).
49
50

COM. LAW
COM. LAW

§ 14-3504(a)(I).
§§ 14-3504(b)-(c).
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infonnation stored in a paper record is no less vulnerable or sensitive. 51
Should Marylanders not be given the same opportunity to protect
themselves from identity theft when their credit card infonnation is stolen
from a business's paper records? It makes no sense to offer these records
less protection than their computerized counterparts, especially
considering the financial and security implications of identity theft.
Maryland should join the minority of states that require notification
regardless of the medium in which the personal infonnation is stored. 52
III.

PARTIES SUBJECT TO THE STATUTE

The applicability of the MPIP A needs to expand in scope to include
government. Currently, MPIPA is only applicable to businesses. 53 The
Act defines a "business" as "a sole proprietorship, partnership,
corporation, association, or any other business entity, whether or not
organized to operate at a profit." 54 It also specifies that the tenn
"[b ]usiness" includes "a financial institution organized, charted, licensed,
or otherwise authorized under the laws of this State, any other state, The
United States, or any other country, and the parent or subsidiary of a
financial institution.,,55 Excluding government from this legislative
scheme is unreasonable given the history of security breach notification
laws, the government's susceptibility to breaches in infonnation security,
the infonnation stored by the government, and the prevalence of state
security breach notification laws that include government entities. 56 Also,
while Maryland provides some government safeguards, they do not
provide the same level of protection that an expansion of MPIPA's
jurisdiction would bestow.

51
See Timothy H. Skinner, California's Database Breach Notification Security Act: The
First State Breach Notification Law Is Not Yet a Suitable Template for National Identity Theft
Legislation, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH I, '\140-41 (Fall 2003) (discussing privacy advocates'
concerns with California's security breach notification legislation and its failure to provide
protection to paper records).
52
See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.48.0 I O(a) (West 2010); see also HAW. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 487N-2 (West 2010); IND. CODE. ANN. § 24-4.9-2-2 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
93H, § 3 (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-65 (West 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98
(West 20 I 0).
53
See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3502 (West 2011) (requiring that businesses take
precautions when destroying customer records that contain personal information); see also
COM. LAW § 14-3503 (mandating that businesses implement reasonable security procedures
and practices to protect the personal information of Marylanders); COM. LAW § 14-3504
(requiring businesses to notifY individuals when there has been a security breach that
jeopardizes their personal information).
54
COM. LAW § 14-3501 (b)(1).
55
COM. LAW § 14-3501 (b)(2).
56
St. Amant, supra note 29, at 519-20; see infra note 73.
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California promulgated the first state security breach notification law
in 2003 in response to a breach at the Stephen P. Teale Data Center, a
state operated data storage facility. 57 The data center housed the sensitive
personal information of state employees, including first and middle
initials, last names, and social security numbers. 58 The breach, which
occurred on April 2, 2002, potentially exposed the personal information
of 265,000 employees. 59
The subsequent investigation revealed
concerning gaps in the state's information security at this center. 60 As a
direct result, California passed the Database Breach Notification Security
Act and, not surprisingly, the Act applies to government. 61
Considering the susceptibility of government agencies to security
breaches, as evident in the California breach, it is incongruous that
Maryland does not apply MPIP A to the government. One privacy rights
organization reports that over 130,000,000 government and military
records containing personal information have been breached since 2005. 62
According to the Identity Theft Resource Center's data for 2010,
breaches of government records accounted for over 15% of all reported
breaches63 and also have been among some of the largest. 64 An example
of such vulnerability occurred in 2006 when the Department of Veteran
Affairs revealed a breach that compromised the data of approximately
26.5 million active duty personnel and veterans. 65 Another alarming
example occurred when the National Archives and Records
Administration experienced a breach in 2009 that may have exposed the
personal information of 70 million veterans. 66 The breach occurred when
the agency sent a defective hard drive back to its vendor for repair and
57
See Skinner, supra note 51, at ~~15-20 (discussing the events that led to the passage of
California's security breach notification law).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2011).
62
Chronology oj Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARING HOUSE,
https:llwww.privacyrights.orgldata-breachlnew (last visited Apr. 8, 2012). The Privacy
Rights Clearing House compiles reported information security breaches and stores the
information in a searchable online database. Id. When this database was queried for
Government and Military data breaches on February 29, 2012 it revealed that 132,911,637
records had been compromised from 537 separate breaches. Id.
63
2010 Data Breach Stats, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, 11-14 (Dec. 29, 2010),
available at http://www.idtheftcenter.orgiartman2/uploads/I/ITRC_Breach_Stats_Report_
20101229.pdf.
64
Id.
65
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, A Statement from the Dep't of Veterans
Affairs (May 22, 2006), available at http://wwwl.va.gov/opa/pressreUpressrelease.cfm?
id=1123.
66
Ryan Single, Probe Targets Archives' Handling oj Data on 70 Million Vets, WIRED
(Oct. I, 2009), http://www.wired.comlthreatlevel/2009/1 O/probe-targets-archives-handling-ofdata-on-70-million-vets/.
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recycling without first destroying the data. 67 Maryland Government is
not immune to such security lapses. In 2010, the Maryland Department
of Human Resources experienced a breach that exposed approximately
3,000 records. 68 In this case, an employee of the department posted the
names and social security numbers of 3,000 individuals on his personal
website. 69
It is further unreasonable to exclude government from the effects of
this legislation because it stores the same type of personal information as
businesses.
Consider the information provided to the Maryland
Comptroller on Form 502, the Maryland Resident Income Tax Return. 7o
The form requires first name, last name, and social security number. 71
Bank routing and account numbers are often provided to facilitate
payment of refunds. 72 Also, with online payment of fees, government
agencies are collecting sensitive personal and financial information over
the web on a daily basis. 73 So if government is collecting the same type
of personal information as the private sector and in the same manner, why
is government not held to the same standard under the MPIP A ?
Furthermore, the majority of states that have security breach
notification laws require government entities to comply with, at
minimum, the notification provisions of their legislation. 74 However,
some of these states have exempted government agencies from the
enforcement measures of their security breach notification legislation. 75
Id.
Erin Cunningham, State Employee Posts Social Security Numbers on Website,
GAZETTE (July 23, 20 I 0), http://ww2.gazette.netistories/072320 I 0/polinew203 725 _3253 7.
php.
69
Jd.
70
Form 502, the Maryland Resident Income Tax Return, available at http://forms.
marylandtaxes.comlcurrent_forms/502.pdf.
67

68

71

Id.

72

Id.

73
See, e.g., Maryland Department of Transportation, Fast Track, MOTOR VEHICLES
ADMINISTRATION, available at https://securetransactions.mva.maryland.gov/emvastore/
MustHave2.aspx?SingleUse WindowGuid=899065f9-ce81-41 f3-a638-169fdfdd4da9
(last
visited Apr. 8, 2012) (outlining how the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration's online
registration renewal process gathers a combination of the following data: credit card
information, bank routing and account numbers, Maryland driver's license number, and date
of birth).
74
See Data Quality Campaign, State Security Breach Response Laws: State-by-State
Summary Table, DATA QUALITY CAMPAIGN, available at http://www.dataqualitycampaign.org/
files/State%20Security%20Breach%20Chart%20Final%20for''1020posting%2020 II %2003%2
OlD.pdf (last updated Feb. 2011) (providing a 50 state survey of SBNLs, which includes the
identification of states that apply their SBNL to government).
75
Florida, Hawaii, Maine, and Tennessee specifically exclude government entities from
enforcement proceedings. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568I(l)(d) (West 2011) ("administrative
sanctions outlined in this section shall not apply in the case of personal information in the
custody of any governmental agency or subdivision"); HAw. REv. STAT. § 487N-3(a), (b)
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Essentially, these governments are required to notify individuals of
breaches, but non-compliance is not punished under their respective
acts. 76 In addition, the federal government, through the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB"), requires federal agencies to develop
and implement breach notification policies. 77 In light of this and the
information outlined above, Maryland needs to join this majority and
apply the standards of the MPIP A to government.
Even though government is not currently subject to MPIPA, there are
personal information protections in place at Maryland state agencies. The
Maryland Department of Information Technologies ("DolT") has
developed an information security policy to be followed by all "Executive
Departments and Independent State agencies . . . in order to protect the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of state owned information.,,78
The security policy sets requirements regarding asset management,
physical security, network security, and access contro1. 79 The security
requirements serve the same function as MPIPA's mandate that
businesses that own or license personal information of Maryland
residents "implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and
practices.,,8o While these measures are important in preventing security
breaches, there is nothing in DolT's Information Security Policy that
requires agencies to provide notice to individuals whose information has
been compromised. In addition, this policy does not create an option of
recourse for affected individuals. The enforcement provision of this
policy focuses on "[d]isciplinary action, up through termination ....,,81
Given that these security procedures lack a notification requirement and
(West 2011) (exempting government form the Act's civil fines and private actions for
damages); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 10, § 1349(\)(A) (West 2011) (indicating that civil fines
do not apply to the government); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107(h) (West 20 II) (exempting
government from the private right of action provision of the enforcement measures).
76
Florida, Hawaii, Maine, and Tennessee specifically exclude government entities from
enforcement proceedings. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(1)(d) (West 2011) ("administrative
sanctions outlined in this section shall not apply in the case of personal information in the
custody of any governmental agency or subdivision"); see also HAW. REv. STAT. § 487N-3(a),
(b) (West 2011) (exempting government from the Act's civil fines and private actions for
damages); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1349(\)(A) (West 2011) (indicating that civil fines
do not apply to the government); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107(h) (West 2011) (exempting
government from the private right of action provision of the enforcement measures).
77
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Memorandum

for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Safeguarding Against and Responding to
the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information, I (May 22, 2007), available at
http://www .whitehouse.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/omb/memorandalfy2007Im07 -16. pdf.
78
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, Information Security Policy
Version 2.3, 4 (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.djs.state.md.us/policies/
DoITSecurityPolicy.pdf.
79 Id. at 5-6, 19-29.
80
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3503(a) (West 2011).
81
Maryland Department ofInforrnation Technology, supra note 78, at 30.
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individual recourse, it is critical that Maryland amend MPIPA to include
government. 82
IV. NOTIFICATION

Another important element of security breach notification legislation
is the notification process, which can be broken down into basic
components: notification triggers, timing of notice, method of notice,
contents of the notice, and receiving parties. 83 While most of MPIPA's
notification process is effective, there are two areas where changes are
necessary. First, the notification trigger is vague and needs to be clarified
in order to avoid over-notification of individuals. Second, the deadline
for notifying individuals about a security breach needs to be clearly
defined to ensure an expedient response and to lower security breach
response costs for "anxious" businesses.

A. Acquisition vs. Harm Notification Triggers
The initial trigger for notification under a security breach notification
law ("SBNL") is the occurrence of a security breach that compromises an
individual's personal information. 84 However, once a security breach has
occurred, states diverge on when to require notification. Some states, like
California, have a broad notification trigger that requires individual
notification whenever an unauthorized acquisition of personal
information has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur.85 Critics of this
trigger argue that the acquisition approach is too broad and will
desensitize the public to the severity of security breaches. 86 In addition, it
82
The Maryland Department of Infonnation Technology has released its new
Infonnation Security Policy that goes into effect in April 2012. These updated policies do not
address notification. See generally Maryland Department of Infonnation Technology,
Information Security Policy Version 3.0 (Oct. 2011), available at http://pilot.doit.maryland.
gov/supportlDocuments/security_guidelineslDoITSecurityPolicyv3. pdf (outlining the policies
ofthe Maryland Department ofInfonnation Technology).
83
See COM. LAW §§ 14-3504(b)-(j).
84
See COM. LAW §14-3504(b) (requiring individual notification after the breach of the
security of a system).
85
See, e.g., CAL. Cry. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2011) (requiring regulated entities to
"disclose any breach of the security of the system following discovery or notification of the
breach in the security of the data to any resident of California whose unencrypted personal
infonnation was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized
person").
86
See Skinner, supra note 51, at ~~33-34 (discussing the Investment Company Institute's
opposition to California's security breach notification law and its acquisition trigger for
notification); see also Jill Joerling, Note, Data Breach Notification Laws: An Argumentfor a
Comprehensive Federal Law to Protect Consumer Data, 32 WASH. UJ.L. & POL'y 467,487
(2010) (arguing for the creation of a federal security breach notification law that requires a
reasonable chance of hann to trigger notification, in order to help "prevent consumers from
receiving an influx of useless notifications").
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places the higher burden on businesses by requiring expensive
notification even when there is no reasonable indication of harm. 87
Finally, it has been argued that, due to the technical limitations of
intrusion detection software, acquisition triggers may be broader than
intended. 88
Other states have attempted to narrow the triggering event by
requiring an element of harm. 89 By adding this requirement, these
statutes limit notification to cases in which the business experiencing the
breach determines that some level of injury is likely to occur to the
individual whose information has been exposed. 9o However, the level of
harm required in these statutes varies. Some states, such as Colorado,
allow a business to forego notification if after investigating the breach it
detennines that "misuse" of the personal information has not occurred or
will not likely occur. 91 Other states do not require notification if there is
no reasonable likelihood of "harm.,,92 With such vague standards, there is
no guidance as to what constitutes "misuse" or "harm." Conversely,
some states define the type of harm required to trigger notification,
whether it be a financial harm as required by Arizona,93 or a specific
crime like Virginia, which requires notification only when a breach
"causes, or the individual or entity reasonably believes has caused, or will
cause, identity theft or other fraud to any resident of the
Commonwealth.,,94 Opponents of the harm trigger argue that it offers the
individual inadequate protection from identity theft by failing to provide
individuals the opportunity to protect themselves. 95 In particular, the fact
that the compromised business is left to evaluate whether a likelihood of
harm is reasonable upsets critics of this system. 96
Skinner, supra note 51, at ~~33-34.
See Skinner, supra note 51, at ~3 8 (discussing the limitations of intrusion detection
software and the practical effects on California's acquisition trigger for notification of security
breaches).
89
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-11O-105(d) (West 2011) ("[n]otification under this
section is not required if, after a reasonable investigation, the person or business determines
that there is no reasonable likelihood ofhann to customers.").
90
ld.
91
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716(2)(a) (West 2011).
92
See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:3074(0) (2011) ("[n]otification under this title is
not required if after a reasonable investigation the person or business detennines that there is
no reasonable likelihood ofhann to customers.").
93
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-7501(L)(l) (2011) (defining a security breach as an
unauthorized acquisition of personal infonnation that "causes or is reasonably likely to cause
substantial economic loss to an individual").
94
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(A)(West2011).
95
See Tom, supra note 27, at 1595-97 (discussing the drawbacks of allowing regulated
entities to conduct their own investigations to determine whether a significant risk of hann
exists as the result of security breaches).
96 ld.
87
88
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The MPIP A utilizes a "misuse" trigger to initiate individual
notification. MPIP A defines a breach of the security system as "the
unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the
security, confidentiality, or integrity of the personal information
maintained by a business . . . . ',97 Once a breach has occurred it can
trigger two notification duties. 98 The first duty is placed on businesses
that own or license personal information. 99 After a security breach is
discovered, these businesses are required to "conduct in good faith a
reasonable and prompt investigation to determine the likelihood that
personal information of the individual has been or will be misused as
result of the breach."loo If, after conducting this investigation, the
business determines that "misuse of individual personal information has
occurred or is reasonably likely to occur," they must notify the affected
individua1. 101 The second duty is placed on businesses that maintain
computerized personal information that they do not own or license. 102
These businesses are required to notify the business for which they are
maintaining the personal information when the breach "has resulted or
will result in the misuse of personal information of an individual residing
in the State.,,103 The second duty would then trigger the business' duty to
inform owners or licensees of the security breach. 104
The current misuse notification trigger in Maryland's statute is too
vague to provide businesses with appropriate guidance and will result in
unnecessary notifications and expenses. In its current form, the statute
leaves open questions regarding what level of harm the term "misuse" is
intended to protect against. What level of harm is the term "misuse"
intended to avoid? Misuse could be interpreted to encompass a broad
range of consequences beyond identity theft or financial harm, and could
include, for example, reputational harm. The vague nature of this term is
only compounded by the requirement that notification be provided when
misuse is "reasonably likely to occur.,,105 This combination of language
creates a trigger that is as broad as an acquisition-based trigger. Such a
reading may result in individuals receiving notifications when there is no
concrete risk of harm. It also may force businesses to unnecessarily
allocate resources to the notification processes when these resources

97
98

99

100
101
102
103
104

105

MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504(a)(I)(West 2011).
COM. LAW § 14-3504(b)-(c).
COM. LAW § 14-3504(b).
COM. LAW § 14-3504(b)(l).
COM. LAW § 14-3504(b)(2).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504(c)(l) (West 2011).
COM. LAW § 14-3504(c)(l).
COM. LAW § 14-3504(c)(I).
COM. LAW § 14-3504(b)(2).
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could be better spent on improvements to the businesses' infonnation
security programs.
To reduce the risk of over-notification and inefficient allocation of
business resources, Maryland needs to adopt a concrete definition of the
hann it is trying to avoid. This can be accomplished by linking the
notification duty to the threat of Identity Fraud, as defined in section 8301 of the Criminal Law Article of the Maryland Code. I06 The crime
covers a range of threats. However, the relevant prohibitions are (1)
obtaining personal identifying infonnation without consent "in order to
use, sell, or transfer the infonnation to get a benefit, credit, good, service,
or other thing of value in the name of the individual,,,lo7 and (2) assuming
the identity of another "to avoid identification, apprehension, or
prosecution for a crime; or with fraudulent intent to: (i) get a benefit,
credit, good, service, or other thing of value; or (ii) avoid the payment of
debt or other legal obligation."lo8 This approach, which has been adopted
by numerous states,109 provides regulated entities with a clearer definition
of the threats to be evaluated in their security breach investigation. It also
aligns the Act with homeland security and financial threats posed by
these data breaches.
In addition, MPIP A should be amended to help ensure that businesses
conduct adequate investigations into the risks generated by an
infonnation security breach. MPIPA already has one safeguard in place:
It mandates that if a business detennines that notification "is not required,
the business shall maintain records that reflect its detennination for 3
years after the detennination is made."IIO
By requiring this
documentation, the Act establishes an incentive to conduct a serious
investigation of the security breach. Such documentation can be used to
evaluate the investigation in cases where the security breach results in
hann to individuals, yet the business forwent notification based on their
risk assessment. This incentive could be strengthened by requiring the
business to provide this documentation to the Consumer Protection
Division of the Office of the Attorney General, the office responsible for

106
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-301 (West 2011); see generally COM. LAW § 143504(b)(2), (c)(I).
107
CRIM. LAW § 8-301(b).
108
CRIM. LAW § 8-301(c).

109

See State Security Breach Response Laws: State-by-State Summary Table,

DATA

QUALITY
CAMPAIGN,
http://www.dataqualitycampaign.org/files/State%20Security%
20Breach%20Chart%20Final%20for''1020posting%2020 II %2003%20 10.pdf (last updated
Feb. 2011) (providing a survey of state security breach notification laws and indicating that
eleven states link their notification trigger to identity theft or fraud).
110
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504(b)(4)(West Supp. 2011).
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the enforcement of MPIP A. III In addition to strengthening the incentive
to conduct reasonable investigations, the above-described process would
also provide the State with greater situational awareness and better define
the scope of information security breaches in Maryland. Currently, the
State is only provided notice when businesses determine there is
sufficient risk of misuse to trigger individual notification. I 12

B. Timing o/Notification
With security breach notification laws ("SBNL"), once the duty to
report a security breach is triggered, regulated entities must provide
notification within a certain time period. I \3 The majority of states require
that notification be made in "the most expedient time possible" and
"without unreasonable delay.,,114 However, three states have set specific
boundaries for notification. Florida, Ohio, and Wisconsin require
notifications be made without unreasonable delay, but no later than 45
days after learning of the breach. I 15
The MPIP A requires businesses that own or license computerized
personal information to provide notification of security breaches to
individuals "as soon as reasonably practicable" after the business
conducts the required investigation into the security breach. 116 A similar
time line is placed on businesses that maintain personal information for
other businesses.1I7 These businesses must provide the owners of this
data notice of a security breach as soon as reasonably practicable. I IS This
notification then triggers the owner's duty to investigate and notify
individuals of the security breach. 119
This provision should be amended to create a definitive deadline for
security breach notification, creating a bright line rule, like the ones
adopted by Florida, Ohio, and Wisconsin, and providing several benefits
to Marylanders and regulated businesses. First, it could help reduce the
compliance costs for businesses subject to the legislation. A recent study
111
See COM. LAW § 14-3508 (making a violation ofMPIPA "an unfair or deceptive trade
practice within the meaning of Title 13 of this article"); see also COM. LAW § 13-201
(designating the Division of Consumer Protection in the Office of the Attorney General to
administer Title 13, the Consumer Protection Act).
112
See COM. LAW § 14-3504(h) ("[p]rior to giving the notification required under
subsection (b) of this section and subject to subsection (d) of this section, a business shall
provide notice ofa breach of the security of a system to the Office of the Attorney General.").
113
See Joerling, supra note 86, at 477.
114
/d.; accord Data Quality Campaign, supra note 109, at 1.
115
FLA. STAT. ANN. §817.5681(l)(a) (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1349. 19(B)(2)(West Supp. 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. §134.98(3)(a) (West 2011).
116
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504(b)(1)-(3)(West Supp. 2011).
117
COM. LAW § 14-3504(c)(1)-(2).
118
COM. LAW § 14-3504(c)(2).
119
COM. LAW § 14-3504(b)(l)-(2).
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by the Ponemon Institute revealed that companies that respond fastest to
SBNLs incur the largest response expense. 120 In 2010, a study indicated
that companies who notified victims within one month of discovering a
data breach averaged a cost of $268 per record. 121 Their slower
counterparts only paid an average response cost of $174 per record. 122
The study suggested "moving too quickly through the data breach process
may cause cost inefficiencies for the organization, especially during the
detection, escalation and notification phases.,,123 The Ponemon Institute
speculated that such an increase reflects the "pressure companies feel to
comply with commercial regulations and state and federal data protection
laws.,,124
Maryland can relieve some of the compliance anxiety
experienced by these companies by clearly defining the time parameters
for notification. This would allow them to more efficiently manage their
response costs.
Second, a specific deadline for notification better protects Marylanders
J,Jy placing an upper limit on what is an acceptable notification time.
Opponents of this approach argue that setting a precise deadline for
notification allows businesses to unnecessarily delay notification in order
to "cover up the breach or investigate how best to notify customers.,,125
This argument is flawed. First, it assumes a race to the bottom and an
inefficient notification deadline. The Ponemon Institute study indicated
that 43% of surveyed businesses responded within a month. 126 This
means 57% of the surveyed businesses took longer than 30 days. 127 If set
properly, a bright line notification cutoff could improve the response
times of companies that are not as anxious to comply with the current
standard because of the inherent ambiguity of the existing language.
Such a standard would still retain a degree of flexibility because of the
delay provisions within MPIP A. The act further allows for a delay in
notification if a "law enforcement agency determines that the notification
would impede a criminal investigation or jeopardize homeland or national
security," or if the business needs time to "determine the scope of the

120 PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2010 Annual Study: u.s. Cost of a Data Breach, SYMANTEC, 30
(Mar. 2011), available at http://www.symantec.comlcontentienJus/aboutimediaJpdfs/
symantec jJonemon_data_breach_costsJeport.pdf.
121
ld.
122
!d.
123
ld.
124
ld.
125
See Tom, supra note 27, at 1600 (arguing that any federal security breach notification
legislation should adopt a "most expedient time possible and without reasonable delay"
standard for notification).
126 PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 16, at 13.
127
See id.
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breach of security of a system, identify the individual affected, or restore
the integrity of the system.,,128
V.

PREEMPTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURES

As a result of inherent structural flaws in security breach notification
laws, preemptive security measures are necessary to reduce the need for
breach notification.
While Maryland's legislation emphasizes
information security, MPIPA can be strengthened in three specific areas.
First, to ensure better information security standards, the "reasonable
security procedures and practice" requirements must be clarified. 129
Second, the reasonable security procedures and practice requirements
need to be applied directly to businesses that maintain personal
information on behalf of other businesses. Third, MPIPA's encryption
exemption needs to be eliminated to ensure that it does not undercut other
security initiatives. By instituting these adjustments, Maryland will help
reduce the need for security breach notifications by creating a better
information security standard.
A. The Inherent Flaw ofSecurity Breach Notification Laws

There is an intrinsic structural defect in all state security breach
notification laws ("SBNL") that can discourage organizations from
providing notice. Security breach notification laws delegate enforcement
to the regulated entities: businesses that own, license, or maintain
personal information. 130 The basic enforcement dilemma arises from the
fact that SBNLs apply to a broad spectrum of enterprises, covering all
sectors of the economy. 131 This expansive reach is not accompanied by a
designated regulatory entity to herd this diverse flock. 132 There are no
governmental or third party audits ensuring that businesses report their
security breaches. As a result, SBNLs rely on the better nature of the
regulated entities and their fear that a breach will be reported by an
outside source. 133 The lack of resources for enforcement needs to be
examined in conjunction with compliance costs. A business that reports a
security breach can expose itself to lawsuits, civil fines, criminal charges,
and reputation damage. Also, the investigation of a security breach and

MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504(d)(I) (West Supp. 2011).
COM. LAW § 14-3503.
130
COM. LAW § 14-3503(a).
131
See Jane K. Winn, Are "Better" Security Breach Notification Laws Possible?, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1133, 1156 (March 6, 2009) (discussing the inherent enforcement
dilemma created by the broad reach of SBNLs and the reSUlting lack of clear regulatory
oversight).
132
See Winn, supra note 131,at 1156-57.
133
ld. at 1155-56.
128
129
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the provision of required notification can be expensive. As noted earlier,
in 2010 the average response cost for a large information security breach
was $7.2 million. 134 The combination of weak enforcement and
potentially high compliance costs can create a situation that favors
violation of a notification provision. 135
The above described enforcement quagmire is compounded by the fact
that SBNLs place a greater burden on businesses with sophisticated
information security policies and practices.136 These organizations are
better positioned to detect a security breach and therefore trigger the
notification requirement. Ironically, the SBNLs "punish" businesses that
devote a higher level of resources to avoiding security breaches.
However, smaller, less sophisticated entities that lack the resources to
detect breaches and businesses with negligent security practices will
escape the notification requirement. 137 This dynamic can disincentivize
responsible information security practices. 138 As a result of these inherent
structural flaws, it is imperative that security standards are clearly defined
to help ensure a baseline of detection capabilities and to minimize the
inherent notification disincentives by reducing the occurrence of security
breaches.

B. The Current Protections ofMPIPA
Fortunately, Maryland requires regulated entities to take protective
measures to help avoid information security breaches and alleviate the
need for notification. 139 MPIP A focuses on security breach prevention in
three ways. First, MPIP A requires businesses to "take reasonable steps to
protect against unauthorized access to or use of the personal information"
when destroying a customer's records. 140 Second, businesses that own or
license the personal information of Maryland residents are required to
"implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices"
in order to prevent the "unauthorized access, use, modification or
disclosure" of this information. 141 Third, to encourage encryption,
MPIP A provides a safe harbor for data that has been encrypted, redacted,
or otherwise made unreadable or unusable. 142 Any information that is
supra note 16, at 13.
See Winn, supra note 131, at 1143-45 (discussing how the inherent structure of
security breach notification laws can provide a disincentive to report security breaches).
136
See id. at 1149.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 1148-49 (explaining how SBNLs struggle to account for smaller, less
sophisticated businesses that lack the ability to detect security breaches).
139 See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3503 (West Supp. 2011).
140
COM. LAW § 14-3502(b).
141
COM. LAW § 14-3503(a).
142
See COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(l).
134

135

PONEMON INSTITUTE,
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specifically protected in this manner is exempt from the statute's
definition of personal information. 143 This, in turn, exempts it from the
disposal, notification, and the reasonable information security procedure
requirements of the statute. l44 While these provisions provide basic
protection against information security breaches, they can be improved
upon.

C. Clarification ofReasonable Security Procedures and Practices
To ensure adequate protection of personal information, MPIPA needs
to provide additional guidance regarding reasonable security procedures
and practices. Currently, businesses that own or license the personal
information of Maryland residents are required to "implement and
maintain reasonable security procedures and practices" in order to
prevent the "unauthorized access, use, modification or disclosure of this
information.,,145 This requirement is open to a range of interpretations
and is reliant on litigation to define what is reasonable-a reactive rather
than a proactive approach to information security. To address this issue,
the Consumer Protections Division of the Office of the Attorney General
("Consumer Protection Division") should draft regulations that require a
written information security protocol with certain procedural and
technical elements.

1.

Rule Making Authority of Consumer Protection Division of the
Office of the Attorney General

The Consumer Protection Division has the authority to draft
regulations clarifying the reasonable security procedures and practices
requirements in MPIPA. 146 Failure to institute reasonable security
practices and procedures to protect personal information is a violation of
MPIPA.147 Any violation of this Act is considered an unfair or deceptive
trade practice under Title 13 of Maryland's Commercial Code. 148 Under
Title 13, the Consumer Protection Division has been granted authority to
143
See COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(l) (excluding data that has been "encrypted, redacted, or
otherwise protected by another method that renders the information unreadable or unusable"
from the definition of personal information).
144
See COM. LAW § 14-3502(b) ("[w]hen a business is destroying a customer's records
that contain personal information of the customer, the business shall take reasonable steps to
protect against unauthorized access to or use of the personal information ... "); see also MD.
CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3503(a) (West 2011) (requiring reasonable security procedures
and practices to protect personal information from unauthorized access); MD. CODE ANN.,
COM. LAW § 14-3504(b) (West 2011) (requiring individual notification when misuse of
personal information has occurred or is likely to occur as the result of a security breach).
145
COM. LAW § 14-3503(a).
146
See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-205(a) (West 2002).
147
COM. LAW § 14-3503(a).
148
COM. LAW § 14-3508.
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"adopt reasonable rules, regulations, and standards appropriate to
effectuate the purpose of this subtitle, including rules, regulations, or
standards which further define specific unfair or deceptive trade
practices.,,149 Drafting regulations that define reasonable security
procedures and practices as requiring an information security plan with
specific procedural and technical requirements clearly falls within this
grant of authority.
2.

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Model

To clarify the information security standards required by MPIPA,
Maryland should first look to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLB Act"),
which requires financial institutions to protect the security and
confidentiality of their customers' nonpublic personal information. ISO
Congress required that the exact contours of this obligation be defined
through administrative regulation. 151 Pursuant to this act, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) drafted regulations that require financial
institutions to
develop, implement and maintain a comprehensive information
security program that is written in one or more readily accessible
parts and contains administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards that are appropriate to your size and complexity, the
nature and scope of your activities, and the sensitivity of any
customer information at issue. 152
To guide financial institutions in the creation of their information security
programs, the FTC enumerated five basic structural and procedural
elements. 153 The first of these elements requires regulated entities to
coordinate an information security program. 154
While a simple
requirement, the regulation helps create accountability within an
organization.
The second element mandates that financial institutions conduct a risk
assessment to "[i]dentify reasonably foreseeable internal and external
risk[ s] to the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer
COM. LAW § 13-205(a)(l).
15 U.S.C.A. § 6801(a) (West 2012) (stating that "[i]t is the policy of the Congress that
each financial institution has an affinnative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of
its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic
personal infonnation").
151
See id. §6801(b) ("In furtherance of the policy in subsection (a) of this section, each
agency or authority described in section 6805(a) of this title shall establish appropriate
standards for the financial institutions subject to their jurisdiction relating to administrative,
technical, and physical safeguards .... ").
152
FTC Standards for Safeguarding Customer Info., 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (2011).
153
FTC Standards for Safeguarding Customer Info., 16 C.F.R. § 314.4 (20ll).
154
16 C.F.R. § 314.4(a).
149

150

152
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information. . .,,155 At a minimum, the regulations proceed to specify
three areas that should be evaluated in the risk assessment. 156 The
relevant areas include "(1) [e]mployee training and management; (2)
[i]nformation systems, including network and software design, as well as
information processing, storage, transmission, and disposal; and (3)
[d]etecting, preventing and responding to attacks, intrusions, or other
systems failures.,,157 The planning element is critical because it provides
basic guidance on where institutions should evaluate risk while allowing
the flexibility to contour their plans to the specific challenges discovered
in this assessment.
Third, once a risk assessment is completed, financial institutions are
required to design safeguards to control the identified risks and to
regularly monitor the effectiveness of these controls. 158 Such guidance is
important because it emphasizes that the information security program is
a dynamic plan that must be continually tested to ensure its effectiveness.
The fourth element mandates that financial institutions contractually
ensure that their service providers are capable of providing appropriate
safeguards for their customers' personal information. 159 Maryland has
already incorporated this element into MPIP A by dictating that
businesses must contract for reasonable security procedures and practices
when they provide personal information to a nonaffiliated third party. 160
The fifth procedural element of these regulations requires evaluation
and adjustment of the information security plan in three scenarios. 161 The
plan should be adjusted based on: (1) the findings of the regular
monitoring and testing of information safeguards; (2) whenever there are
material changes to the institution's operations or business; or (3)
whenever "any other circumstances that you know or have reason to
know may have a material impact on your information security
program.,,162 These procedures emphasize that information security is not
stagnant, and therefore, an information security plan should be an organic
document that adapts and grows as its environment changes.
The federal regulations outlined above provide excellent guidance for
the development of an information security program. These regulations
dictate key structural and procedural elements while allowing businesses
the flexibility to craft these plans to their specific circumstances. By
adopting similar regulations, the Consumer Protections Division can
155
156
157

158
159
160
161
162

16 C.F.R. § 314.4(b).
ld.
/d.
16 C.F.R. § 314.4(c).
16 C.F.R. § 314.4(d).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3503(b) (West Supp. 2011).
16 C.F.R. § 314.4(e).
ld.
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provide a road map to establishing reasonable security procedures and
practices that will benefit less sophisticated enterprises and ensure an
improved level of information security.
3.

Technical Guidance

In addition to providing procedural guidance, the Consumer Protection
Division should provide technical guidance to proactively ensure that
basic and effective precautions are instituted. Massachusetts provides an
interesting model for this proposition. Pursuant to its security breach
notification law, Massachusetts adopted regulations that provide for a
written security program requirement similar to the one developed by the
FTC under the GLB ACt. 163 However, it created additional technical
requirements for the computer systems of regulated entities. 164 The
regulation states "that, at a minimum, and to the extent technically
feasible," information security programs must contain the following
elements:
(1) secure user authentication protocols, (2) secure access control
measures, (3) encryption of all transmitted records and files
containing personal information that will travel across public
networks, and encryption of all data containing personal
information to be transmitted wirelessly, (4) [r]easonab Ie
monitoring of systems, for unauthorized use or access to personal
information, (5) [e]ncryption of all personal information stored on
laptops or other portable devices, (6) firewall protections, (7)
[r]easonably up-to-date versions of system security agent
software, and (8) specific education and training of employees on
the proper use of computer security system and the importance of
personal information security. 165
Massachusetts provides additional guidance regarding several of the
technical elements listed above. For example, when describing the level
of required access control, the regulations state that these measures
should:

163
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, § 2(a) (West 2011) (instructing the Department
of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation to adopt regulations to safeguard the personal
information of residents of Massachusetts); compare 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03 (20ll)
(outlining the procedural requirements of Massachusetts's comprehensive information
security program requirement), with 16 C.F.R. § 314.4 (providing the procedural requirements
for the information security program for financial institutions subject to G-L-B Act).
164
See 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.04 (2011) (designating specific computer system
requirements for entities subject to the Commonwealth's SBNL).
165
Id.
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(a) restrict access to records and files containing personal
information to those who need such information to perform their
job duties; and (b) assign unique identifications plus passwords,
which are not vendor supplied default passwords, to each person
with computer access, that are reasonably designed to maintain
the integrity of the security ofthe access controls. 166
While some of the requirements resound of common sense, they provide
technical guideposts to ensure that less secure entities are put on notice
regarding the basic technical elements of a "reasonable" information
security program.
Although Massachusetts provides an admirable framework for
Maryland to consider, there is one specific area that should be further
delineated. Maryland should create a specific benchmark for the level of
encryption required to ensure reasonable security. Under its information
security regulations, Massachusetts defines encryption as "the
transformation of data into a form in which meaning cannot be assigned
without the use of a confidential process or key.,,167 Similarly, MPIPA
defines encryption as "the transformation of data through the use of an
algorithmic process into a form in which there is a low probability of
assigning meaning without use of a confidential process or key." 168 Both
of these definitions fail to acknowledge that there are different levels of
data encryption. 169 In order to clearly identify the required level of
encryption, Maryland should benchmark the encryption requirement to an
established national standard. Nevada has adopted this approach by
defining encryption under its security breach notification law as:
the protection of data in electronic or optical form, in storage or in
transit, using: (1) An encryption technology that has been adopted
by an established standards setting body, including, but not
limited to, the Federal Information Processing Standards issued
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which
renders such data indecipherable in the absence of associated
cryptographic keys necessary to enable decryption of such data ...
170
Benchmarking MPIPA's encryption standard to the Federal Information
Processing Standards ("FIPS") issued by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology ("NIST") provides several benefits. First, it
166
167

168
169

See id. at 17.04(2).
See id. at 17.02.
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-350 1(c)(West 2011).
See Skinner, supra note 51, at 45-46 (discussing the varying types of encryption while

analyzing California's SBNL).
170
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 603A.215(5)(b) (West 2011).
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provides a specific definition for the expected encryption standard. l7I
Second, the FIPS for encryption are reviewed every five years "in order
to consider new or revised requirements that may be needed to meet
technological and economic changes." 172 This review process makes
FIPS an efficient benchmark. The encryption standard will automatically
adjust as technology progresses, without expending any of Maryland's
resources. Third, NIST and the Canadian Government's Communication
Security Establishment maintain the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program ("CMVP,,).173
This program certifies whether or not
cryptographic modules comply with the encryption standards of FIPS. 174
The CVMP also maintains a list of vendors who provide these certified
products. 175 This vendor list could be used to link regulated entities to
products that meet the new standard ifMPIPA benchmarks its encryption
standards to FIPS.
Also, it is interesting to note that the Maryland Department of
Information Technology has adopted an internal encryption standard
benchmarked to FIPS and required on all portable data storage devices
containing confidential information. 176 If Maryland deems this an
appropriate security standard for its confidential information, it seems
that it would be appropriate to require the same of businesses that store
personal information.
Given the large number of information security breaches resulting
from lost or stolen laptops and data storage devices, encryption of such
devices is particularly relevant to Maryland. In 2008, 45.6% of the
information security breach notices reported to the Maryland Attorney
General's Office related to stolen laptops and portable data storage
devices. 177

171
See NIST, FIPS Publication 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,
12-40 (May 21, 2001), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/
fips1402.pdf (providing security standards for various aspect of cryptographic modules).
172
Id. at vi.
173
Cryptographic Module Validation Program, NIST: COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION:
COMPUTER SECURITY RESOURCE CENTER, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html
(last updated Feb. 16,2012).
.
174
Id.
175
Module Validation List, NIST: COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION: COMPUTER SECURITY
RESOURCE CENTER, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STMlcmvp/validation.html (last updated Apr.
5,2012).
176
Maryland Department of Information Technology, Information Security Policy
Version 2.3, 6-7 (September 2010), available at http://doit.maryland.gov/supportlDocuments/
security_guidelineslDoITSecurityPolicy. pdf.
177
The Maryland Attorney General's Office makes each information security breach
notice it receives available on its website and has records from 2008-2010. A survey of these
notices indicates that stolen laptops and data storage devices constituted 102 of the 228
reported security breaches in 2008. Maryland Attorney General, Maryland Information
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Certification ofInformation Security Plans

Clearly defining the parameters of required information security
measures is critical in protecting the personal information of Maryland
residents. However, these measures are only effective if adopted by the
regulated entities. In order to encourage compliance with the proposed
information security standards, Maryland should create a third party
certification process similar to the independent self-regulatory
organizations in the securities market that assess whether products
conform to technical standards. 178 Such certification could create a
rebuttable presumption that the organization has instituted reasonable
security procedures and practices. 179 In the alternative, Maryland could
empower an agency to administer this certification process with
administrative costs covered in part by an application fee. In either event,
the certification process could incentivize regulated entities to adopt
security measures to help decrease the risk of liability from a security
breach.

D.

Direct Application of the Reasonable Security Procedures and
Practices Requirement to Those Who Maintain Personal
Information on Behalf of Other Businesses

MPIP A needs to apply its reasonable security procedures and practices
requirement directly to businesses that maintain this data on behalf of
other entities to better protect the personal information of Maryland
residents. Currently, MPIP A only requires businesses that own or license
personal information to implement and maintain reasonable security
procedures and practices. 180 However, when these businesses use a
nonaffiliated third party as a service provider and disclose the personal
information of a Maryland resident to this third party, they are required to
contract for these same security standards. 181 This dynamic limits the
recourse against third party "data maintainers" to contractual actions. In
contrast, businesses that own or license this data are subject to civil fines
and criminal sanctions because they have an affirmative duty under
MPIPA to maintain reasonable security. 182

Security Breach Notices - 2008, available at http://www.oag.state.md.us/idtheftJ
breachNotices2008.htm.
178
See Winn, supra note 131, at 1160 (proposing the creation of a national infonnation
security standard for personal infonnation and the institution of an independent certification
process that would create a presumption that reasonable precautions had been instituted by the
regulated entity).
179
Jd.
180
181
182

MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3503(a) (West 2011).
COM. LAW § 14-3503(b).
COM. LAW § 13-411.
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Any violation of MPIPA is deemed "an unfair or deceptive trade
practice within the meaning of Title 13 of this article; and subject to the
enforcement and penalty provisions contained in Title 13 of this
article.,,183 Connecting MPIPA to the enforcement and penalty provisions
of Title 13 creates a private right of action for individuals damaged by an
MPIPA violation. 184 The connection also allows for civil fines up to
$1000 for each violation of MPIPA, and up to $5000 per violation for
repeat offenders. 18S There are also criminal sanctions that can result in a
"fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding one year or
both .... ,,186 All of these enforcement actions are available when a
company that owns or licenses personal information fails to reasonably
protect the information. 187 However, third party "data maintainers" are
not subject to these enforcement mechanisms because MPIP A places no
affirmative duty to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices
upon these entities. 188
"Data maintainers" that possess personal
information should be subject to the full range of repercussions for failing
to reasonably protect the information. Focusing enforcement on the
parties that own or license personal data results in a missed opportunity to
use MPIPA to increase the security of Marylanders' personal information.

E.

Eliminating the Encryption Safe Harbor Provision

The way MPIPA's encryption exemption is structured undercuts the
effectiveness of other protections offered by the act, and needs to be
eliminated. Currently, the encryption exemption is incorporated into the
act's definition of personal information. The relevant section of code
states that
'[p]ersonal information' means an individual's first name or first
initial and last name in combination with anyone or more of the
following data elements, when the name or the data elements are
not encrypted, redacted, or otherwise protected by another method
that renders the information unreadable or unusable. 189
As discussed in sections II.A.I and II.D.2 of this article, the duties
created by SBNLs only extend to personal information. 19o By exempting
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

COM. LAW § 14-3508.
COM. LAW § 13-408(a)
COM. LAW § 13-4IO(a)-(b).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-41 I (a) (West Supp. 2011).
COM. LAW §§ 13-410,13-411.
COM. LAW § 14-3503.
COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(l).
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 3504(a)(I) (West 2011) (defining the breach of

a security system as the "unauthorized acquisition of computer data that compromises ... the
personal information maintained by a business") (emphasis added); see also MASS. CODE
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encrypted data from duties like the notification requirement, SBNLs
attempt to encourage businesses to adopt encryption technology. 191
Unfortunately, this incentive undercuts the MPIPA's efforts to require
preemptive protections. Since encrypted personal information is removed
from the purview of Md. Code Ann., Com. Law section 14-3503,
businesses only need to encrypt their data and take no other security
measure. l92 Thus, the encryption exemption becomes the definition of a
reasonable security.
Such a dynamic has the potential to create greater security risks
because it equates encryption with reasonable security. Encryption
should be an important part of a security program, but should not be the
only part. 193 "Security is only as strong as the weakest link, and the
mathematics of cryptography is almost never the weakest link . . . .
[s]ecurity is a broad stockade: it's the things around the cryptography that
make the cryptography effective.,,194
The Maryland Department of Information Technologies' Information
Security Policy supports this assertion. The policy establishes standards
for not just encryption, but also asset management, physical security,
network security, and access control. 195
Two simple examples where encryption alone fails to create a
reasonable security protocol are unauthorized employee access and static
personal information. Unauthorized employee access could involve a
former employee who had secured the encryption key while employed.
The former employee could exploit this key to breach encrypted personal
information if the company has weak user authentication protocols that
do not quickly adjust the employee's access to the database. It will also
be difficult to detect this unauthorized access if the business does not
have a reasonable monitoring system for their database. Both of these
security protocols-restricting access to active users and active user
accounts and instituting reasonable monitoring systems-are required in
REGs. § 17.04 (2011) ("[e]very person that owns or licenses personal information ... shall
include in its written, comprehensive security program ... ") (emphasis added).
191
See Winn, supra note 131, at 1145-46 (analyzing the encryption exemptions
effectiveness as a "technology-forcing legislation").
192
COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(J) ('''[p]ersonal information' means an individual's first
name or first initial and last name in combination with anyone or more of the following data
elements, when the name or the data elements are not encrypted ... ") (emphasis added).
;93
See Skinner, supra note 51, at 'tI'tI46-49 (stating that encryption is "designed to
supplement an overall risk-based security program. It is part of the solution, not the
solution").
194
See Winn, supra note 131, at 1146 (quoting BRUCE SCHNEIER, PRACTICAL
CRYPTOGRAPHY, at xviii (2003)).
195
Maryland Department of Information Technology, Information Security Policy
Version 2.3, 1-2 (September 2010), available at http://doit.rnaryland.gov/supportJDocuments/
securitypidelineslDoITSecurityPolicy.pdf.
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Massachusetts' computer system security requirements, 196 provisions that
Maryland should adopt. Furthennore, current employees can present the
same threat to encrypted personal infonnation. This threat can be
mitigated by having secure access control procedures that (1) restrict
access to records containing personal information to only those who
require this infonnation for their job function, and (2) assign unique
identifications and passwords to these employees.
Again, these
procedures are part of Massachusetts' computer system security
regulations. 197
The second example of where encryption alone fails to provide
reasonable infonnation security is in the protection of static personal
information. Static personal information, such as a social security
number, does not change over time. A thief could obtain encrypted static
personal information and keep this data until the technology capable of
breaking the encryption exists. 198 The infonnation, despite the delay,
could be used to perpetrate identity theft due to its fixed nature. Again,
adopting a broader, more robust security protocol could mitigate this
threat.
These examples of unauthorized employee access and static personal
information show the danger of allowing MPIPA's encryption exemption
to undercut the Act's reasonable security procedures and practice
requirement. To prevent the exemption from devouring this protective
measure, it must be removed. However, encryption benchmarked to an
appropriate federal standard, like the Federal Information Processing
Standard, should be required as part of the broader security procedures
and practices proposed earlier in this artic1e. 199 In addition, MPIPA's
notification requirement should be amended to indicate that the presence
of the required encryption standard is a factor in the detennination of
whether the breach of security will result in a likelihood of hann
sufficient to trigger a notification duty.200 These adjustments will ensure
a better security standard while preventing unnecessary notification when
there is little risk ofhann.

196
See 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.04 (2011) (designating specific computer system
requirements for entities subject to the state's SBNL).
197
Id.
198
See Skinner, supra note 51, at ~49 (discussing the challenge of protecting static
information with encryption).
199
See supra IV.C.3 (discussing the need to require encryption benchmarked to a federal
standard).
200
See supra IILA (discussing the amendment of MPIPA so that notification is clearly
linked to the risk ofidentity Fraud as defined by MD. CODE, CRlM. LAW § 8-301).
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ENFORCEMENT MEASURES

Clarification is needed regarding how violations of MPIP A will be
handled under the civil provisions of Maryland's Consumer Protection
Act. Any violation of MPIP A is considered "(1) an unfair or deceptive
trade practice within the meaning of Title 13 of the article; and (2) [i]s
subject to the enforcement and penalty provisions contained in Title 13 of
this article.,,201 The section of Title 13, the Consumer Protection Act, that
addresses civil violations states "[a] merchant who engages in a violation
of this title is subject to a fine of not more than $1,000 for each
violation.,,202 However, repeat offenders can be fined up to $5,000 for
each violation. 203 These civil fines may be collected by the state in a civil
action, an administrative cease and desist action, or an administrative
hearing. 204
MPIPA's connection to these provisions creates an issue with how
violations of MPIP A will be quantified. Will the failure to provide notice
regarding a security breach be considered a single violation, or will
failure to provide notice for each exposed record be considered a unique
violation? This determination has a significant impact on the civil
sanctions of the Consumer Protection Act. In a security breach that
exposes the personal information of 100,000 individuals, the civil fine
could top out at $1,000 or at $100 million for a first time offender. 205
Also, if this hypothetical security breach occurred because the business
did not have reasonable security procedures and practices in place, there
could be additional confusion. Is lacking the required security a single
violation, or is the exposure of each record, as the result of unreasonable
security, considered a unique violation? Again, the violator is potentially
looking at the difference between a $1,000 and a $100 million civil
fine. 206
There are problems with both interpretations of the term "violation."
First, under this enforcement scheme, if violation is defined by the breach
rather than the number of individuals affected, it creates a very weak
incentive for compliance. A $1,000 civil penalty for failing to notify
100,000 individuals would easily be overshadowed by the cost of

202

MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3508 (West 2011).
COM. LAW § 13-410(a).

203

COM. LAW § 13-410(b).

201

COM. LAW § 13-410(c).
COM. LAW § 13-401(a) (reflecting that, if the merchant's security violation of exposing
100,000 records is perceived to be one violation of the Consumer Protection Act, he or she
could be subject to a $1,000 fine; however, if the violation is interpreted to be 100,000
separate violations of the title, the merchant could be fined $5,000 per subsequent violation,
which equals $100 million fine).
206
See COM. LAW § 13-4 I O(a).
204
205
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investigating the breach and notifying the affected individuals. 207 Even
though MPIP A provides a private right of action for individuals affected
by violations of the act,208 it is generally very difficult to recover in
private actions under SBNLs. 209 In these claims, the individual must
prove that the violation of the SBNL was the source of their hann. 2\o
However, since a violation of MPIPA is enforced under the Maryland
Consumer Protections Act,211 the civil penalties do not require that the
violation caused harm.2l2 This aspect can make civil penalties a more
reliable compliance incentive, but when this penalty is set too low it loses
its effectiveness.
The second approach, defining a violation of MPIP A by the number of
affected individuals, is also problematic under the current enforcement
structure. As the earlier example illustrated, a failure to notify 100,000
individuals could theoretically result in a $100 million fine.213 This is a
worst-case scenario, and the Consumer Protection Division has discretion
in setting the amount of the violation, up to $1,000 per violation for first
time offenders. 214 However, it highlights that there is no statutory cap for
civil fines under the enforcement scheme, and there is potential for
excessive penalties. 215
As a result of the flaws in each potential interpretation of "violation,"
the definition of violation needs to be clarified and restructured. The
enforcement mechanism of the Consumer Protection Act is useful in that
they endow the Consumer Protection Division with considerable
authority and a broad array of enforcement toolS. 216 However, as
207
See PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2010 Annual Study: U.S. Cost of a Data Breach, 18 (Mar.
2011), available at http://www.symantec.comlcontentienJus/aboutimediaJpdfs/symantec_
ponemon_data_breach_costsJeport.pdf (stating that the average notification cost for a large
security breach in 2010 was $511,454).
208
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-408(a) (West 2011) (stating that "any person may
bring an action to recover for injury or loss sustained by him as the result of a practice
prohibited by this title").
209
See Joerling, supra note 86, at 479 (discussing the limited value of a private right of
action under SBNLs because of the difficulty in proving damages).
210
See Hallowell v. Citaramanis, 88 Md. App. 160, 166, 594 A.2d 591, 594 (1991)
(holding that to establish a private right of action under the Consumer Protection Act, the
consumer must show injury or loss sustained from a practice prohibited by the Act).
211
COM. LAW § 13-408.
212
See COM. LAW § 13-302 ("[a]ny practice prohibited by this title is a violation of this
title, whether or not any consumer in fact has been misled, deceived, or damaged as a result of
that practice."); see also Hallowell v. Citaramanis, 88 Md. App. 160, 166, 594 A.2d 591, 594
(1991) (holding that a public action does not necessarily require a consumer to prove damage).
213
See COM. LAW § 13-41O(a).
214
See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-4IO(a)-(b) (West 2011).
215
See COM. LAW § 13-4IO(a).
216
See generally COM. LAW §§ 13-401 to 13-410 (West 2011) (outlining the quasi-judicial
powers of the Consumer Protection Division related to the enforcement of the Consumer
Protection Act).

162

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 42.2

demonstrated above, the civil penalty framework is awkward when
applied to MPIP A. In developing a clear and fluid enforcement scheme,
there are two basic models utilized by other states that should be
considered. The first model quantifies the violation by the security
breach, rather than the number of individuals affected, and sets a
considerable civil penalty. For example, Missouri's SBNL has adopted
an enforcement system that allows the attorney general to "seek a civil
penalty not to exceed one hundred fifty thousand dollars per breach of the
security of the system or series of breaches of a similar nature that are
discovered in a single investigation.,,217
The second model defines a violation as unique to an affected
individual, sets a significantly lower fine per violation and establishes a
liability cap for the breach itself. Utah adopted this model and its SBNL
states:
[a] person who violates this chapter's provisions is subject to a
civil fine of: (a) no greater than $2,500 for a violation or series of
violations concerning a specific consumer; and (b) no greater than
$100,000 in the aggregate for related violations concerning more
than one consumer.218
Michigan implemented a similar approach and clarified its enforcement
measures by stating that a person who violates their SBNL "may be
ordered to pay a civil fine of not more than $250.00 for each failure to
provide notice.,,219 However, such liability is limited to $750,000 for any
Either of these models would improve the
security breach. 220
enforcement mechanisms of MPIP A because they clearly define what
constitutes a violation, provide sufficient penalties to incentivize
compliance, and cap a regulated entity's liability while still leaving the
Attorney General discretion to adjust the penalty for the specific
circumstances of the security breach.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Identity theft presents real financial and homeland security threats that
must be met with a broad spectrum of resources. Maryland has taken an
217
Compare Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.1500(4) (West 2011); with OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 24,
§ 165(b) (West 2011) (allowing the attorney general or the district attorney to impose a "civil
penalty not to exceed One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars [$150,000.00] per breach of the
security of the system or series of breaches of a similar nature that are discovered in a single
investigation"), and W. VA. CODE ANN. §46A-2A-104 (West 2011) (stating that "[n]o civil
penalty shall exceed one hundred fifty thousand dollars per breach of security of the system or
series of breaches of a similar nature that are discovered in a single investigation.").
218
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-30 1(3)(West 2011).
219
MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 445.72(13) (West 2011).
220
See id. § 445.72(14).
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important step toward protecting its residents with the Maryland Personal
Information Protection Act. However, there are gaps in the legislation
which are the result of loopholes and ambiguous provisions that create
unnecessary vulnerability. There are three major loopholes to address.
First, MPIPA's definition of personal information must be amended to
ensure greater inclusion of sensitive data, and to allow the statute to
remain effective as technology and data use progresses. Second, the Act
must provide the same protections to paper and other traditional data
mediums as it gives to electronic data. Third, it is essential to expand
MPIPA's jurisdiction to include government. It is foolish to exempt
government when it collects the same sensitive data and is subject to the
same breaches in information security.
The ambiguity that lurks in select provisions of MPIPA must also be
clarified. MPIP A needs a definitive notification trigger tied to the threat
of Identity Fraud in order to prevent over-notification, to help regulated
entities contain their response costs, and to better align the act with the
homeland security risk presented by stolen identities. A specific
notification deadline should also be established to ensure that individuals
receive notice expeditiously and that businesses can more efficiently
manage their response resources. Similarly, MPIPA's reasonable security
procedures and practices requirement can be clarified through regulations
that outline the procedural and technical components of an adequate
information security program. In conjunction with providing this
guidance, the State should incentivize the adoption of these new
requirements by creating a certification process that will provide a
refutable presumption of compliance with the statute's preemptive
measures. Also, to ensure that these new information security standards
are effective, Maryland needs to apply them to every regulated entity that
possesses the personal information of a Maryland resident, including
businesses that maintain this data on behalf of another entity. The
encryption exemption in the definition of personal information must also
be eliminated to prevent it from undermining the prophylactic measures
of MPIP A. Finally, Maryland must clarify the civil penalties of MPIP A
to ensure sufficient compliance incentive. By making these adjustments,
Maryland can provide its residents with a more efficient security breach
notification law that will better protect their personal information from
those who would exploit it.

